In this book, authors Lee Bosher and Ksenia Chmutina argue that to achieve better design and construction of the built environment to withstand and recover from catastrophic risks, a wider range of stakeholders need to become involved in developing more proactive strategies. A key contrast in the volume is between whether disaster risk reduction considerations are brought forward into project conception and design and company policy or whether risk reduction is an afterthought. The volume develops a series of guilding principles for developing a "A holistic multi‐hazard/threat and multi‐stakeholder approach," with the goal of increasing the relience of the built environment to catastrophic events. The book covers a range of hydro-meteorological and geological risks.
In "Policy Expertise in Times of Crisis" (Policy & Politics, 52,1: 2-23), Aagaard, Easton and Head explore the challenges that policy advisory systems face in crisis situations. They point out that the "form and content of valued expertise is highly variable" (6) and explore how this variation shapes the quality and character of expert knowledge provided during a crisis. Two key dimensions of variation are whether policy experts are "insiders" or "outsiders" and whether expertise is provided "formally" or "informally." The authors also point out that policy experts may be seen as knowledge "shapers" or knowledge "providers," depending on how actively experts are engaged in proactively mobilzing knowledge. These and other variations in policy expertise may "facilitate or frustrate" productive relationships between experts and politicians during crises (10). This article introduces a special issue of Policy & Politics exploring the role of policy experts during COVID and Climate Change crises. A key lesson from the special issue is that "[g]overnments will choose different paths, but they all need to consider appropriate sources of expert advice during crisis, and who participates in the expertise-shaped policy conversations in crisis situations" (17).
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Collapsing bridges and buildings are rare events, but they do repeatedly occur. This book investigates the non-technical--human and institutional--causes of these collapses, and in particular, those factors that lead those who approve, design, maintain or inspect these structures to "neglect their professional standards and/or existing regulation." Investigating four well-documented international cases of building or bridge failure, Seibel finds that the situational causes vary, but he uncovers a common patttern of "normalization of deviance" or "intended ignorance" and weak or absent leadership as common mechanisms of failure. Basically, people did not step up an take responsibility when they had the opportunity to so. He argues that a common feature of these cases is that they exhibit a "responsiveness-responsibility tradeoff," where the responsivness of public officials to other stakeholders eroded their situational sense of responsibility for upholding safety standards.