The New York Times reported today on their investigation of Jeju Air Flight 2216 Crash, which occurred on December 29, 2024 as the flight was landing at Muan International Airport in Korea ("Decades of Blunders Left Deathtrap at Runway's End"). Birds knocked out an engine just before landing, but the total destruction of the aircraft occurred when the plane ran into structure to assist pilots with navigation.
Based on document review, the Times "found a series of design and construction failures that allowed the wall to be built with concrete and put too close to the runway, in violation of international safety guidelines." The structure was initially designed to have breakable foundations, but a design change substituted concrete, a much more rigid material. Later, regulators approvied add more concrete. The Transport Ministry was aware of this safety issue, but neglected opportunities to redress it.
These findings reminded me of a book I read recently by Wolfgang Seibel that examines the errors that lead to collapsing structures. The irony here is that the structure should have been designed to collapse. But the analysis is roughly the same.
This book investigates the non-technical--human and institutional--causes of these collapses, and in particular, those factors that lead those who approve, design, maintain or inspect these structures to "neglect their professional standards and/or existing regulation." Investigating four well-documented international cases of building or bridge failure, Seibel finds that the situational causes vary, but he uncovers a common patttern of "normalization of deviance" or "intended ignorance" and weak or absent leadership as common mechanisms of failure. Basically, people did not step up an take responsibility when they had the opportunity to so. He argues that a common feature of these cases is that they exhibit a "responsiveness-responsibility tradeoff," where the responsivness of public officials to other stakeholders eroded their situational sense of responsibility for upholding safety standards.